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THE EFFECT OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1984 ON
ALIMONY AND TRANSFERS OF PROPERTY INCIDENT TO
DIVORCE
The Tax Reform Act of 19841 made substantial changes affecting the
tax consequences of divorce. This comment will focus on the changes
made in the tax treatment of transfers of property incident to divorce,2 in
the definitional requirements of alimony and separate maintenance,3 and
on the changes affecting "alimony" trusts and other forms of property.4 It
will then analyze these changes by contrasting them, in light of congres-
sional intent, with their pre-Tax Act development and treatment and at-
tempt to draw some conclusions with respect to their effectiveness. Other
changes affecting domestic relations are not within the scope of this
comment.5
I. TRANSFERS OF PROPERTY
A. Background
In 1962, the United States Supreme Court settled lower court conflict
regarding the taxability of property transfers pursuant to divorce.' In
United States v. Davis,7 the Court held that the transfer of property
1. The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of I.R.C.) is divided into two divisions. "Division A" is the
Tax Reform Act of 1984 [hereinafter cited as Tax Act].
2. See infra notes 6-52 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 53-140 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 141-156 and accompanying text.
5. The Tax Act, supra note 1, also made changes in the rules relating to the dependency
exemption, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 423, 98 Stat. 799 (codified in scattered sections of I.R.C.);
innocent spouse rules, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 424, 98 Stat. 801 (same); and in the gift and
estate tax provisions of certain property settlements, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 425, 98 Stat. 803
(same).
6. The courts of appeals had reached different conclusions on the taxability of transfers of
appreciated property. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Marshman, 279 F.2d 27 (6th Cir. 1960)
(transfer nontaxable); Commissioner v. Mesta, 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941) (transfer
taxable).
7. 370 U.S. 65 (1962). For a detailed study of the Davis rule, see DuCanto, Federal Tax
Law: Where You Divorce Does Make a Difference, 9 Loy. U. CHL L.J. 397 (1978); Gunn, The
Federal Income Tax Effects of the Missouri Version of the Uniform Divorce Act, 1974
WASH. U.L.Q. 227; Schwartz, Divorce and Taxes: New Aspects of the DAvis Denouement, 15
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from one spouse to the other, in full or partial release of inchoate marital
rights,8 would constitute a taxable event unless the transfer was an equal
division of co-owned property.9
State law controlled the question of whether a transfer of property was
an equal "division" of co-owned property (nontaxable) or an "exchange"
in release of inchoate marital rights (taxable).10 Spouses divorced in com-
munity property states1 ' would most likely12 find their transfers a nontax-
able division of property because, in those states, "all property acquired
during marriage is considered to be owned by both spouses equally.' 13
Spouses in common law jurisdictions, however, would be subject to a tax-
able exchange unless the transfer was an equal division of "property pre-
viously held in joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety."'4 Therefore,
federal tax consequences varied depending on whether the divorced
spouses were domiciled in a community property or common law state.' 5
The Davis decision was met with a plethora of harsh criticism, mainly
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 176 (1967); Weinstock & Walzer, Tax Aspects of Divorce in Community
Property and Noncommunity Property States, 42 TAXES 386 (1964); Note, The Effect of
Recent Statutory Changes in Minnesota on the Taxation of Property Transfers Upon Dis-
solution of Marriage, 65 MINN. L. REv. 127 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Statutory
Changes in Minnesota]; Note, Should Federal Income Tax Consequences of Divorce De-
pend on State Property Law?, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1401 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Divorce and State Property Law]; Comment, The Federal Income Tax Consequences of
Property Settlements in Common Law States and Under the Uniform Marriage and Di-
vorce Act: A Proposal, 29 ME. L. REv. 73 (1977); Comment, Transfer of Appreciated Prop-
erty Pursuant to Divorce: Taxable Event in Oregon?, 53 OR. L. REv. 544 (1974).
8. Inchoate marital rights refer to those common law or statutory rights which will vest
upon the death of the other spouse. See, e.g., Davis, 370 U.S. at 65 n.3.
9. Id. at 71-73. The court disagreed with the holding of the Sixth Circuit in Marshman,
which had held that the event was nontaxable because the value of the inchoate marital
rights was indeterminable. The Court reasoned that a divorce was an arm's length transac-
tion and, accordingly, the value of the inchoate marital rights would be equal to the fair
market value of the property received. Id.
10. Id. at 70, 71. Although the Davis Court recognized that its holding would cause con-
siderable disparity between common law and community property states in the tax treat-
ment of transfers of property incident to divorce, the Court stated that any change was in
the province of the legislature. Id.
11. Community property states include: Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Texas and Washington. See 4A R POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1
625(2) (1982).
12. Potential problems relating to the impossibility of dividing specific assets were laid to
rest when the Tax Court held that any good-faith equal division of community property, in
the aggregate, would be nontaxable. See Clifford H. Wren, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 290 (1965); see
also Rev. Rul. 76-83, 1976-1 C.B. 213-14 (ruling that if both spouses receive an equal share
of the value of the community property then no taxable event occurs). However, unequal
divisions in value would constitute a taxable event. See Jean C. Carrieres, 64 T.C. 959
(1975). See generally DuCanto, supra note 7.
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because differences in state law produced seemingly capricious federal tax
consequences.16 Other criticism focused on the harsh tax consequences"
or asserted that the Davis rule was unconstitutional. 8 Many common law
states were also unreceptive; believing that their taxpayers were being
treated unfairly, they attempted either judicial 9 or legislative 0 circum-
vention. Almost all, however, agreed that there was a need for legislative
reform.21
B. Transfers of Property Under the Tax Act
1. Congressional Intent
Congress recognized that the Davis rule,22 governing spousal transfers
of property incident to divorce, "[had] not worked well and [had] led to
much controversy and litigation."'1 In order to correct these problems,
protect unwary divorcing spouses,24 and make the tax laws less intru-
sive,25 Congress abrogated the Davis decision by creating section 1041 to
govern the transfer of property between former spouses.26
2. Tax Treatment of Transfers of Property
Under the new law, if property is transferred from one former spouse to
the other "incident to divorce,"27 then no gain or loss will be recognized
16. E.g., DuCanto, supra note 7; Lepow, Proposals to Reform the Tax Treatment of
Property Divison Incident to Divorce-A Splitting Headache, 10 COMMUNITY PROP. J. 237
(1983); Note, Divorce and State Property Law, supra note 7; see also Note, Divorce and
State Property Law, supra note 7, at 1406 n.27.
17. See DuCanto, supra note 7, at 408.
18. See id. at 408; Note, Divorce and State Property Law, supra note 7, at 1431.
19. See, e.g., Imel v. United States, 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975). In that case, the Colo-
rado Supreme Court, upon certification from the federal district court in Imel v. United
States, 375 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1974), held a spouse acquired a vested interest in the
other spouse's property by filing for divorce. The Tenth Circuit, on appeal, affirmed the
holding that no taxable event had occurred because the transfer was in recognition of
"vested" property rights. Imel v. United States, 523 F.2d at 855. See generally DuCanto,
supra note 7; Note, Divorce and State Property Law, supra note 7.
20. Several common law states made changes in the statutory rights of spouses in order to
give those spouses substantial ownership interest in property acquired during marriage. See,
e.g., Gunn, supra note 7; Note, Statutory Changes in Minnesota, supra note 7.
21. See supra notes 16-18.
22. See supra text accompanying notes 6-9.
23. H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1491 (1984). The conference committee agreed




26. See Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 421(a), 98 Stat. 793 (codified as amended in I.R.C.
§ 1041).
27. See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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on the property transferred to the former spouse."' For income tax pur-
poses, these transfers will be treated as gifts,2" and the transferor's ad-
justed basis will be "carried-over" to the transferee spouse.3 0
Transfers are considered to be "incident to the divorce" 31 if they either
"[occur] within one year after the date on which the marriage ceases' 2 or
"[relate] to the cessation of the marriage."' "3 Any transfer made pursuant
to a "divorce or separation instrument" and occurring not more than six
years after the date on which the marriage ceases will be treated as "re-
lated to the cessation of the marriage."' 4 Any transfer which is not pursu-
ant to a divorce or separation instruments or which occurs more than six
years after the cessation of the marriage will be a taxable event as the
transfer will be "presumed to be not related to the cessation of the
marriage.""5
Although these transfers are treated as gifts, the rules governing the
determination of basis acquired by gift'-providing for a reduced basis
in loss situations' 7 -do not apply.' s In all transfers governed by the Tax
Act, the transferee spouse will assume the transferor spouse's basis.' 9
28. I.R.C. § 1041(a) (1984). Transfers of property to third parties on behalf of a former
spouse may also qualify for section 1041 nonrecognition. In those situations which qualify,
the transfer will be treated as if made directly to the nontransferring spouse and then re-
transferred to the third party. The deemed retransfer to the third party does not qualify for
section 1041 nonrecognition treatment. See 49 Fed. Reg. 34,453 (1984) (to be codified at 26
C.F.R. § 1.1041-1T(c)(Q&A9)) (proposed Aug. 31, 1984).
29. I.R.C. § 1041(b)(1) (1984).
30. Id. § 1041(b)(2).
31. Id. § 1041(c).
32. Id. § 1041(c)(1). Even bona fide sales within this period will be treated pursuant to
section 1041. See 49 Fed. Reg. 34,453 (1984) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.1041-
1T(d)(Q&A11)) (proposed Aug. 31, 1984).
33. I.R.C. § 1041(c)(2) (1984).
34. 49 Fed. Reg. 34,453 (1984) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.1041-1T(b)(Q&A7)) (pro-
posed Aug. 31, 1984).
35. Id. (emphasis added). This presumption may be rebutted only by showing that the
transfer was made to effect the division of property owned by the former spouses at the
time of the cessation of the marriage. Id. For example, the transfer was not made within the
required time period because of legal impediments to the transfer and the transfer is ef-
fected promptly after the impediment is removed.
36. I.R.C. § 1015(a).
37. Compare id. § 1015(a) (providing that the transferee's basis will be equal to the fair
market value if the basis in the hands of the transferor is greater than the fair market value)
with id. § 1041(b)(2) (in all cases, the transferee's basis will be the same as the basis in the
hands of the transferor).
38. See Tax Act, supra note 1, at § 421(b)(5) (adding I.R.C. § 1015(e), which requires the
basis of all property transfers described in I.R.C. § 1041(a) to be determined under LR.C.
§ 1041(b)(2)).
39. Generally, this rule means that the transferee will not be subject to recapture as the
transferee will step into the shoes of the transferor. See I.R.C. §§ 1245(b)(1) & 1250(d)(1)
(1984). However, recapture of investment tax credits may occur if the property transferred
to the transferee is not "section 38" property to that transferee. See 49 Fed. Reg. 34,454
[Vol. 19:129
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The Tax Act's nonrecognition and carry-over rules apply, not only to
transfers made in release of inchoate marital rights, but also to transfers
made in exchange for cash,40 other property, or any other form of consid-
eration.41 These rules also apply to transfers in trust,42 and to transfers of
annuity43 and life insurance contracts, 44 which will be discussed in Part
IV of this comment.
4 1
3. Effective Date
Except for property transferred pursuant to a divorce or a separation
instrument in effect before July 18, 1984, all property transferred incident
to divorce after that date will be subject to the new nonrecognition and
carry-over rules.4'6 However, if both parties wish to do so, they may elect
to have the new provisions apply to all transfers made after December 31,
1983.4 7 In the case of transfers made pursuant to decrees in effect before
July 18, 1984, the parties may also elect to have these new provisions
apply.'8
C. Impact of the Changes
The Tax Reform Act of 1984 should prove very successful in accom-
plishing Congress' objectives regarding transfers of property incident to
divorce.49 Its rules are simple and absolute; if property is transferred inci-
dent to a divorce, the event will be nontaxableY' As a result of the Tax
Act, state property laws will no longer control federal income tax conse-
quences. Although this rule will not prevent or discourage litigation to
determine which particular items of property will be transferred, the need
for litigation regarding the taxability of such transfers has been
eliminated.
These changes will also be more equitable because they will be uniform
and will not result in unintended tax consequences. Moreover, the
changes will provide the certainty needed in order for the parties to a
(1984) (to be codified at 26 C.F- R § 1.1041-1T(d)(Q&A13) (proposed Aug. 31, 1984).
40. Care should be taken if property is transferred in exchange for cash as it may trigger
alimony treatment. See infra notes 98-107 and accompanying text.
41. H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1492 (1984).
42. See infra notes 143-53 and accompanying text.
43. See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 141-56 and accompanying text.
46. 49 Fed. Reg. 34,454 (1984) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.1041-1T(f)(Q&A15-16))
(proposed Aug. 31, 1984).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
50. See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
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divorce to plan their settlements with definite tax consequences in mind.
The only drawback to the Tax Act is that it may be inflexible. Its rigid
provisions may preclude many transfers that were once entered into be-
cause of the taxability of the event.51 In its entirety, however, the Tax Act
provides the much needed remedy to the pre-Tax Act rules governing
transfers of property incident to divorce.52
II. ALIMONY AND SEPARATE MAINTENANCE
A. Background
Prior to 1942, payments made by one former spouse to the other for
alimony were not deductible by the payor spouse or includable by the
recipient spouse in computing their respective federal taxable incomes. 53
In that year, Congress recognized that, due in part to the substantially
increased federal tax rates necessary to finance World War II,5 4 it became
increasingly burdensome for an individual to pay alimony out of after-tax
income. 5 To alleviate some of this burden, the Revenue Act of 194256
created sections 22(k) and 23(u) of the 1939 Code which required certain
alimony payments to be included in the taxable income of the payee
spouse and deducted by the payor spouse as an itemized deduction. 7
When the 1939 Code was revised in 1954, these provisions were ex-
tended to apply to payments for separate maintenance under a support
decree and became sections 71 and 215, respectively, of the 1954 Code.51
51. There were many situations where a transferee spouse was amenable to the transfer of
property because the transferee was allowed to receive the property with a basis equal to the
fair market value. For example, the transferee may have been amenable to receiving stock
with a fair market value of $50,000 and a basis of $10,000 because he or she could sell the
stock for $50,000 without recognizing any gain. Under the new rules, the same type of trans-
action may be precluded because the transferee will not be amenable to iecognizing a gain
on retransfer; the transferor may have to resort to a third party or straw party transaction
in order to increase the basis to fair market value before the transfer would be amenable to
the transferee spouse. Great care should be taken if the transfer is made to a third party.
See supra note 28.
52. Although beyond the scope of this comment, it must be pointed out that the new
rules of nonrecognition and carry-over basis also apply to all transfers between married
spouses unless the transferee spouse is a nonresident alien. See 49 Fed. Reg. 34,452-53
(1984) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.1041-1T(a)(Q&A1-2)) (proposed Aug. 31, 1984).
53. Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917).
54. The Revenue Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 798 (1942) substantially increased normal and sur-
tax rates and also imposed an additional victory tax.
55. See 88 CONG. REc. 6575 (1942).
56. 56 Stat. 798 (1942).
57. See Gornick, Alimony and the Income Tax: Background And Effect Of The Provi-
sions In The Revenue Act Of 1942, 29 CORNELL L. REV. 28, 29 n.1 (1943). See generally
Johnson, Divorce and Federal Income Tax, 37 MINN. L. REv. 413 (1953); Kramer, Alimony
and the Tax Law, 26 TAxEs 1105 (1948).
58. See Lynch, I.R.C. Section 71: Breaking Up is Hard to Do, 20 DuQ. L. REv. 173, 176
[Vol. 19:129
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Except for minor revisions in 1976, which allowed alimony and separate
maintenance to be deducted in arriving at adjusted gross income,5 these
provisions remained largely unchanged until the Tax Reform Act of
1984.60
Conceptually, the tax treatment of alimony and separate maintenance
has been and continues to be quite simple. Alimony payments or pay-
ments to a spouse "in the nature of or in lieu of alimony or an allowance
for support as between spouses who are divorced or separated"'" are in-
cludable to the payee spouse6 2 and deductible by the payor spouse.6 3 In
practice, however, the pre-Tax Act definitional requirements were so con-
fusing that it was difficult to determine whether certain payments would
be deemed alimony.6 4
1. Statutory Requirements
Generally, payments to which the pre-Tax Act rules apply65 qualified
for treatment under section 71 and were includable in the recipient
spouse's gross income if the following four requirements were met
(1) The payment would have to be made in discharge of a legal obliga-
tion imposed on, or incurred because of, the marital or family
relationship.6
6
(2) The payment would have to be "imposed . .. under [a] decree or
n.8 (1982).
59. The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 502(a) (codified as amended in
LR.C. § 62). For a detailed analysis of the effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 on alimony
and separate maintenance, see Comment, Income Taxation: The Tax Reform Act of 1976
Changes the Treatment of the Individual Taxpayer's Alimony and Child Care Payments, 9
CUM. L. REv. 177 (1978); Comment, Federal Income Tax Consequences of Divorce and Sep-
aration, 16 J. FAM. L. 779 (1977).
60. See infra notes 97-124 and accompanying text. For a detailed analysis of the laws
governing alimony and child support prior to the changes made by the Tax Reform Act of
1984; see Basi & Weinstein, The Internal Revenue Code and Its Impact on Divorce Settle-
ments, 53 TAxEs 132 (1975); Lynch, supra note 58; McClennen, Tax Aspects of Divorce
Settlement Agreements, 4 ARiz. L. REv. 26 (1962); Meldman & Ryan, The Federal Tax
Consequences Of Divorce, 57 MARQ. L. REv. 229 (1974); Rosenkranz, Divorce and the Fed-
eral Income Tax, 16 U. FLA. L. REv. 1 (1963); Schnee, Taxation of Divorce: Review and
Update, 62 TAXEs 33 (1984); Schwartz, Income Tax Aspects of Alimony, 42 TAXES 323
(1964); Note, Taxation of Alimony, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 608 (1965); Comment, Federal Tax
Consequences In Divorce and Separation, 7 UTAH L. REv. 385 (1961).
61. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(a) (1957) (amended 1984).
62. I.R.C. § 71(a) (1954) (amended 1984).
63. Id. § 215(a).
64. See generally Davies, The Taxation of Alimony: Policies, Problems and a Proposal,
31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1355 (1977).
65. See infra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
66. LR.C. § 71(a)(1) to (3) (1954) (amended July 18, 1984).
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. . . written instrument incident to such divorce or separation," 7 pursu-
ant to a written separation agreement,68 or required under a decree for
support or maintenance.69
(3) The payment would have to be "periodic. '7 °
(4) The payment could not have been "fixed" as a sum payable for
child support.71
Installment payments discharging part of a principal sum specified in a
decree, instrument or agreement would not be treated as "periodic. '7 2
However, if the installments continue for more than ten years, then those
payments would be treated as "periodic" but only to the extent of ten
percent of the principal sum.73
If payments qualified for treatment under section 71,74 then under sec-
tion 215 they could be deducted by the payor spouse in arriving at ad-
justed gross income.7 This rule applied to any payments except for dis-
tributions of property in trust, from annuity contracts or from life
insurance contracts. These exceptions are discussed in Part IV of this
comment.76
2. Judicial Amplification
The taxpayer and the Commissioner, natural adversaries, did not al-
ways agree on whether certain payments qualified for treatment under
sections 71 and 215. Ambiguous drafting and lack of congressional guid-
ance7 7 created several gray areas within the statute. Common among
these differences were disputes regarding whether payments were made
under a legal obligation,"' whether the payments were property distribu-
tions versus payments in the nature of alimony support 79 or whether
they were alimony versus child support.8 0
67. Id. § 71(a)(1).
68. Id. § 71(a)(2).
69. Id. § 71(a)(3).
70. Id. § 71(a)(1) to (3).
71. Id. § 71(b).
72. Id. § 71(c)(1).
73. Id. § 71(c)(2).
74. See supra text accompanying notes 66-73.
75. I.R.C. § 215(a) (1954) (amended 1984).
76. See infra notes 141-56 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 58, at n.12.
78. See, e.g., Taylor v. Campbell, 335 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1964); cf. Knobler v. Commis-
sioner, 59 T.C. 261 (1972). See generally Lynch, supra note 58.
79. See, e.g., Mills v. Commissioner, 442 F.2d 1149 (10th Cir. 1971). See generally Lynch,
supra note 58; Comment, Divorce and State Property Laws, supra note 7.
80. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1961) (holding that where an instru-
ment does not state a specific amount that is payable only for child support, then no portion
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Judicial interpretation did not provide the needed guidance. Many
courts magnified the statutory shortcomings."' Others contributed to the
uncertainty-in spite of congressional intent that the statute be applied
uniformlyS2-by basing their decisions on determinations made with ref-
erence to state law.8 3
The confusion which resulted from both the statutory inadequacies and
the judicial interpretations led many commentators to call for reform.84
Indeed, some courts had even recognized that the law had become so per-
plexing that most lawyers could not plan for or understand the tax conse-
quences incident to divorce.8 5
B. Alimony Under the Tax Act
1. Congressional Intent
Congress recognized that the pre-Tax Act definitional requirements of
alimony were not sufficiently objective 6 and resulted in different federal
tax consequences because of differences in state law.87 In order to rectify
these problems and make tax determinations easier for both the Internal
Revenue Service and the parties to a divorce, 8 Congress enacted section
422 of the Tax Act.89 This section attempts to redefine alimony "in a way
that would conform to general notions of what type of payments consti-
tute alimony."80
The Tax Act does not change the treatment of alimony and separate
maintenance-payments which qualify must still be included in the gross
income of the recipient spouse9' and deducted by the payor spouse.82 It
does, however, drastically change the definitional requirements of all-
of the payment will be treated as alimony). See generally Basi & Weinstein, supra note 60;
Whinery, Tax and Non-Tax Negotiations In Alimony and Support After The Lester Case,
15 OKLA. L. REv. 1 (1962); Recent Decisions, Taxation-Income Tax-Deduction Allowed
Husband For Entire Alimony Payment to Wife Unless a Portion Thereof Is Specifically
Designated For Child Support, 15 VAND. L. REv. 298 (1961).
81. See Lynch, supra note 58, at 181.
82. Id. at 179 n.20.
83. Id. at 181-89.
84. See, e.g., Davies, The Taxation of Alimony: Policies, Problems and a Proposal, 31 U.
MIAMi L. REv. 1355 (1977); Lynch supra note 61; Phillips, Separated Under State Law May
Not Be Separated for Purposes of the Section 215 Deduction and Section 71 Inclusion, 60
TAXES 720 (1982).
85. See Lynch, supra note 58, at 175 n.3.
86. H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1495 (1984).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 422, 98 Stat. 795 (codified in I.R.C. §§ 71 & 215).
90. H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1495 (1984).
91. I.R.C. § 71(a) (1984).
92. Id.
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mony and separate maintenance.
2. Definitional Requirements Under the Tax Act
In order for payments to qualify under the new provisions of section
71, 9 3 all of the following requirements must be met:
(1) The payment must be in cash.9 4 Transfers of property or services,
use of property by the payee, or the execution of a debt instrument will
no longer qualify as alimony.9"
(2) The payment must be made pursuant to a "divorce or separation
instrument"96 which encompasses a "decree of divorce or separate main-
tenance[,] . . . a written instrument incident to such [decree],"97 a writ-
ten separation agreement 8 or other types of decrees for the support or
the maintenance of the other spouse.99
(3) The payment must not be designated as an amount which will not
be treated as alimony.100 This provision allows spouses to elect to treat
otherwise qualifying payments as non-qualifying payments.
(4) There must be no liability for the payor spouse to make any pay-
ment or substitute payment after the death of the payee spouse and the
divorce or separation instrument must state that there is no such
liability. 10 1
(5) In the case of spouses legally separated under a decree of divorce or
separate maintenance, the spouses must not be members of the same
household when the payment is made.10 2
93. See supra note 89.
94. I.R.C. § 71(b)(1) (1984).
95. See 49 Fed. Reg. 34,455 (1984) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.71-1T(b)(Q&A5)) (pro-
posed Aug. 31, 1984).
96. I.R.C. § 71(b)(2) (1984). These are the same instruments described in I.I.C. § 71
(1954) (amended 1984). See 49 Fed. Reg. 34,455 (1984) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.71-
1T(a)(Q&A4)) (proposed Aug. 31, 1984).
97. I.R.C. § 71(b)(2)(A) (1984).
98. Id. § 71(b)(2)(B).
99. Id. § 71(b)(2)(C).
100. Id. § 71(b)(1)(B). See also 49 Fed. Reg. 34,455 (1984) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. §
1.71-1T(b)(Q&A8)) (proposed Aug. 31, 1984) (setting forth specific guidelines for making an
election to treat otherwise qualifying section 71 payments as nonqualifying payments).
101. I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(D) (1984). See also 49 Fed. Reg. 34,456 (1984) (to be codified at 26
C.F.R. § 1.71-1T(b)(Q&A1)) (proposed Aug. 31, 1984).
102. I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(C) (1984). The proposed regulations state that spouses not legally
separated may be able to treat payments made pursuant to an instrument described in sec-
tion 71(b)(2)(C) as alimony notwithstanding the fact that they are members of the same
household. 49 Fed. Reg. 34,456 (1984) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.71-1T(B)(Q&A9))
(proposed Aug. 31, 1984).
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(6) The spouses must not file a joint return.'" 3
3. Special Requirements
Payments which meet the definitional requirements for alimony will
qualify for section 71 and 215 treatment if they do not violate the special
rules related to contingencies involving children'" and excess front load-
ing of alimony payments.'
a. Child Support Contingencies
As before, amounts "fixed" for child support are not treated as ali-
mony06 and as such are not includable in the payee spouse's gross in-
come. But, the rules for determining whether a payment is "fixed" for
child support have been drastically changed. Under the Tax Act, pay-
ments will be considered to be fixed for child support if they are reduced
by a contingency related to a child, "such as attaining a specified age,
marrying, dying, leaving school, or a similar contingency,' 10 7 or if the pay-
ments can be clearly associated with a contingency related to a child.0 s
Thus, the rule in Commissioner v. Lester"0 9 is overturned and the pre-
sumption will be that payments are for child support if they are reduced
on the happening of a contingency related to a child. For example, if an
agreement provides that payments (not otherwise specified for child sup-
port) to a spouse will be reduced by $100 when a child reaches eighteen,
then $100 will be treated as though it is fixed for child support. There-
fore, it will not be deductible by the payor spouse." 0
103. LR.C. § 71(e) (1984)..
104. See infra notes 106-110 and accompanying text.
105. See infra notes 112-30 and accompanying text.
106. Compare LR.C. § 71(b) (1954) (amended July 18, 1984) with ]IR.C. § 71(c)(1) (1984).
107. LR.C. § 71(c)(2)(A) (1984).
108. I.R.C. § 71(c)(2)(B) (1984). The proposed regulations describe two situations in
which otherwise qualifying payments will be presumed to be reduced at a time clearly asso-
ciated with the happening of a contingency relating to a child of the payor. The first is
where the payments are to be reduced not more than six months before or after the child
reaches eighteen, twenty-one, or the local age of majority. The second situation is where the
payments are to be reduced at two or more points in time which occur not more than one
year before or after a different child of the payor spouse attains a certain age between the
ages of eighteen and twenty-four, inclusive. The presumption in these situations may be
rebutted by showing that the time at which the payments are to be reduced was determined
independently of the child or it may be rebutted conclusively if the reduction is a complete
cessation of the payments during the sixth post-separation year. 26 C.F.R. § 1.71-
1T(c)(Q&A18) (proposed Aug. 31, 1984).
109. 366 U.S. 299 (1961).
110. Any payment which is insufficient to cover both alimony and child support will first
be applied to such child support. IRC. § 71(c)(3) (1984).
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b. Rules to Prevent Excess Front Loading of Alimony
Congress clearly sought to prevent large, one-time, lump-sum pay-
ments, which are really property settlements, from being treated as ali-
mony. 1 ' To accomplish this, two special rules are imposed upon any pay-
ments over $10,000."'
The first rule sets a minimum term which must be met in order for any
payments, to the extent they exceed $10,000 during any calendar year, to
qualify as alimony. 1 3 It requires payments to be made for a minimum of
six "post-separation years," which are the six years beginning in the year
in which the first payment is to be made." 4 For example, if H is required
under a "divorce or separation instrument"'115 to pay W $25,000 per year
for five years after they are divorced or separated and no payments are to
follow, then only $10,000 would qualify as alimony in years one through
five. If, however, H was also required to make a payment of one dollar in
year six, then the $15,000 per year excess would also qualify as ali-
mony-subject to the recapture rules discussed below.
The second rule provides for the recapture of certain excess alimony
payments."' Under this so-called "recapture" rule, if payments decrease
by more than $10,000 during the six year post-separation period, then
part of the earlier years' payment(s) will be recharacterized."' The
amount recharacterized will be includable in the payor spouse's gross in-
come l s and deductible by the payee spouse." 9 An example will clarify
the application of this rule.
If W is required to make payments to H of $55,000 in year Y1, $43,000
in year Y2, $30,000 in year Y3, and $25,000 per year in years Y4 through
Y6, the "recapture" rule would produce the following results:
In computation year1 20 Y2, the excess of the payment in the prior
year' 2' (Y1) of $55,000 over the current year payment of $43,000 as in-
creased by the statutory exemption of $10,000122 ($53,000) would result in
111. H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1495 (1984).
112. See infra notes 113-30 and accompanying text.
113. See I.R.C. § 71(f)(1) (1984).
114. Id; see also 49 Fed. Reg. 34,457 (1984) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.71-
1T(d)(Q&A22)) (proposed regulations relating the excess front loading of alimony
payments).
115. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
116. See I.R.C. § 71(f)(2) to (3) (1984).
117. I.R.C. § 71(f)(2) (1984).
118. Id. § 71(f)(2)(A).
119. Id. § 71(f)(2)(B).
120. Computation year means the post-separation year for which the excess is being de-
termined. Id. § 71(f)(4)(B).
121. See id. § 71(f)(3)(A)(i).
122. See id. § 71(f)(3)(A)(ii).
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a $2,000 excess or recapture ($55,000 - 53,000) which would be includable
by the payor spouse, W, and deductible by the payee spouse H in the
computation year.123
Computation year Y3 would result in recapture of $3,000 from pay-
ments in year Y2 and $13,000 from the "modified payments, '124 which are
the actual payments made in that year reduced by any amount previously
recaptured with respect to that year, of $53,000 ($55,000 - 2,000) in year
Y1.125
Computation year Y4 would result in no recapture from payments in
year Y3, but recapture of $5,000 from payments in years Y2 and Y1.126
No recapture would occur in years Y5 or Y6 because none of the prior
years would have "modified" payments of more than $35,000.127 Hence,




Payments in Year Y1 ...................................... $55,000
Less: Payment in Year Y2 ................................ $43,000
Exemption .......................................... 10,000 53,000
Excess (Recapture Amount) $ 2,000
124. See I.R.C. § 71(f)(3) (1984).
125.
Computation Year Y3:
Recapture from Year Y2:
Payments in Year Y2 .................................... $43,000
Less: Payments in Year Y3 ............................... $30,000
Exemption ......................................... 10,000 40,000
Excess (Recapture Amount) $ 3,000
Recapture from Year YI:
Payments in Year Y1 .................................... $55,000
Less: Previous Recapture ................................ 2,000
Modified Payments from Y1.............................. $53,000
Less: Payment in Y3 ..................................... $30,000
Exemption ......................................... 10,000 40,000
Excess (Recapture Amount) $13,000
126. The decrease from years Y3 to Y4 is less than $10,000 ($30,000 - 25,000), therefore,
there will be no recapture attributable to year Y3. As the modified payments for years Y1
and Y2 are both equal to $40,000 ($55,000 - (2,000 + 13,000)) and ($43,000 - 3,000), respec-
tively, then $5,000 will be recaptured from both of those years. ($40,000 - ($25,000 +
10,000)).
127. With the $5,000 recapture from both years Y1 and Y2 in computation year Y4 modi-
fied payments for years Y1, Y2 and Y3 will all equal $35,000. Y1 = ($55,000 - ($2,000 +
13,000 + 5,000) = $35,000). Y2 = ($43,000 - ($3,000 + 5,000) = $35,000). Y3 = $35,000.
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These recapture provisions will not apply to payments which cease by
reason of the death or remarriage of one of the spouses12 or to payments
which are fixed as a percentage "of the income from a business or prop-
erty or from compensation for employment or self-employment. 1 2 Cer-
tain support payments may also be exempt from recapture. 30
4. Effective Date
These definitional requirements ' must be applied to all "divorce or
separation instruments" executed after December 31, 1984.132 They may
also be applied to instruments executed on or before that date, but only if
the instrument is modified after that date and expressly provides that
the amended Code provisions will apply to the modified instrument.
133
5. Requirements for Furnishing Identification Numbers
The Tax Act authorizes the Internal Revenue Service to require the
payor spouse to furnish the payee's taxpayer identification number and to
require the payee spouse to furnish his or her identification number to
the payor spouse.13 4 Failure to comply with either of these requirements
may result in a $50 fine.1 35
C. Impact of the Changes
As with property transfers, the Tax Act's provisions which change the
definitional requirements of alimony and separate maintenance"3 6 should
prove very successful in accomplishing Congress' specific goals."'
In order for payments to qualify for treatment as alimony or separate
maintenance, they must meet specific objective requirements which will
be determined without reference to state law. Also, the Lester rule, which
created much confusion and litigation regarding whether payments were
sufficiently "fixed" for child support,' 3 has been abrogated. As a result,
the parties to a divorce and the Internal Revenue Service will be afforded
128. I.R.C. § 71(f)(5)(A) (1984).
129. Id. § 71(f)(5)(C).
130. Id. § 71(f)(5)(B).
131. See supra notes 93-130 and accompanying text.
132. See Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 422(e)(1), 98 Stat. 795 (1984). See also 49 Fed.
Reg. 34,458 (1984) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.71-1T(e)(Q&A26)) (proposed Aug. 31,
1984).
133. See Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 422(e)(2), 98 Stat. 795 (1984).
134. See H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1496 (1984).
135. Id.
136. See supra notes 93-130 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
138. Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1961). See also supra note 80.
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much greater certainty with respect to the tax treatment of certain types
of payments. This result, in turn, should lead to less litigation.
In achieving the desired certainty, however, the provisions of the new
law are necessarily very technical and very specific. 139 As such, these tech-
nical requirements represent a potential trap to the unwary attorney.
Great care should be taken to draft divorce or separation instruments in
light of these requirements and their associated tax consequences.
The "minimum term" and "recapture" rules should also provide
enough of an economic disincentive to prevent "excess front loading of
alimony." As such, they will be effective in deterring large, one-time,
lump-sum payments from being made in the early "post separation pe-
riod." However, as drafted, the statute may provide the economic incen-
tive necessary to cause a deferment of a lump-sum payment in the sixth
post separation year or later. 4"
Thus, the new provisions governing alimony and separate maintenance
should provide the much needed relief from the confused and convoluted
rules of the pre-Tax Act law.
III. HYBRID TRANSFERS
When a payee spouse receives cash distributions which would represent
both income and principal in the hands of payor spouse, these distribu-
tions will fall under both the new provisions relating to transfers of prop-




Under pre-Tax Act law, two types of trusts might be encountered in
connection with a divorce. 4 3 One, called a "Section 682" trust, was typi-
cally created before, and not in contemplation of, the divorce or separa-
tion.14 4 The other type of trust, called a "Section 71" or "Alimony" trust,
139. See supra notes 93-130.
140. As recapture occurs only if payments decrease by more than $10,000, see IR.C.
§ 71(f) (1984), no recapture would occur if a very large lump-sum payment was made in the
sixth year or later as long as the minimum term rule was met. See LR.C. § 71(f)(1) (1984).
141. See supra notes 27-48 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 93-135 and accompanying text.
143. See generally Basi & Weinstein, supra note 60; Davies, supra note 64; Fink, Income,
Gift, and Estate Tax Aspects of Alimony Trusts, 119 TR. & EsT. 54 (Mar. 1980); Gornick,
Taxation of Alimony Trusts-A Need for Congressional Reform, 20 TAXEs 529 (1942);
Gunn, Douglas v. Willcuts, Today: The Income Tax Problems of Using Alimony Trusts, 63
CORNELL L. REV. 1022 (1978); Note, Alimony Trust Income: A Challenge to Taxability, 4
VAL. U.L. REV. 181 (1969).
144. See Davies, supra note 64, at 1366.
1984]
144 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:129
was created incident to a decree of divorce or separate maintenance.145
Income from a "Section 682" trust, to which a payee spouse was enti-
tled, would have been taxable to the payee spouse and not to the settlor
spouse. 146 Distributions of corpus, however, were not taxable to the payee
spouse as the payee would have been treated as a beneficiary of the trust
for all purposes.1
4 7
Income from an "Alimony" trust was also taxable to the payee spouse
in the same manner. But unlike "Section 682" trusts, distributions from
corpus were includable in the payee spouse's income.148 Furthermore, set-
tlor spouses were not allowed to take corresponding section 215 deduc-
tions for alimony attributable to distributions from corpus.1 49
2. Treatment Under the Tax Act
Although the Tax Act is, arguably, inartfully drafted on this point, 50
congressional intent seems to be that payments made by a trust to a di-
vorced spouse will never be treated as alimony payments.' Rather, the
payee spouse will be treated as a trust beneficiary in the same manner as
any other trust beneficiary. 5'
In cases where the transferee spouse only receives a life or term interest
of a transfer in trust, the Tax Act also prohibits that spouse from claim-
ing a basis upon the sale or exchange of his or her interest. 5 '
B. Other Hybrid Transfers
1. Annuity Contracts
In cases in which an annuity contract is transferred to a former spouse,
145. Id. at 1365.
146. I.R.C. § 682(a)(1954) (amended July 18, 1984). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.682(a)-1(a)(2)
(1957).
147. I.R.C. § 682(b) (1954) (amended July 18, 1984). See I.R.C. §§ 652 & 662 (1954).
148. See I.R.C. § 71(a)(1)-(2) (1954) (amended July 18, 1984).
149. See I.R.C. § 71(d) (1954). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.215-1(c) (1957) (amended 1984).
150. Section 71, as amended by the Tax Act, makes no reference to the source from which
cash is received. I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(A) (1984). Thus, a cash payment received by a spouse
from a trust set up pursuant to a divorce decree, etc., would literally qualify as alimony
(assuming the other requirements are met).
151. Where . . . a beneficial interest in a trust is transferred or created, incident to di-
vorce or separation, the transferee will be entitled to the usual treatment ... as the
beneficiary of a trust (by reason of sec. 682), notwithstanding that the. . . payments
by the trust qualify as alimony or otherwise discharge a support obligation. H.R. REP.
No. 432, pt. 2, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1492 (1984).
152. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
153. See Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 98-269, § 421(b)(4), 98 Stat. 793 (1984) (codified as
amended in I.R.C. § 1001(e)(1) (1984)).
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the transferee spouse will be able to recover the transferor's "investment
in the contract" as a tax free return of basis, notwithstanding the fact
that they may literally qualify as alimony. 54
2. Life Insurance Contracts
Many divorce or separation instruments require payor spouses to carry
life insurance in order to provide for the continuation of alimony pay-
ments after the death of the payor. Because the basis of the contract will
carry over to the transferee,'155 the proceeds of the policy will be fully
excludable from the transferee spouse's income. 6
IV. CONCLUSION
The Tax Reform Act of 1984 made much needed changes in laws gov-
erning transfers of property and alimony and separate maintenance.
These changes should eliminate much of the uncertainty in determining
the tax consequences of a divorce settlement. This, in turn, should lead to
less litigation and a better ability to structure divorce settlements in light
of predictable tax consequences. It appears Congress has achieved the
goals it set for the Act.
J. Thomas O'Brien, Jr.
154. See H.R. REP. No. 432, pt. 2, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1492 (1984); cf. IR.C. § 1041(b)
(1984) (Transferee's basis will be equal to the basis in the hands of the transferor. In es-
sence, the transferee steps into the shoes of the transferor).
155. See I.R.C. § 1041(b) (1984).
156. See H.R. REP. No. 432, pt. 2, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1492 (1984).
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